A Tale of Two Treaties

Big(ish) copyright news out of Canada and Mexico that serves as a timely reminder of the central role of trade negotiations in promoting harmonized intellectual property laws. Canadian and European trade negotiators are apparently closing in on a comprehensive economic and trade agreement, which will include intellectual-property provisions. Michael Geist reports that negotiators remained stymied on the agreement’s IP chapter, including copyright-enforcement provisions that the Europeans would like to model on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Any changes will require legislative amendments.

The lack of progress on IP is not surprising. For an IP importer like Canada, increased protection and enforcement costs represent a pretty unambiguous drain on the Canadian economy and will likely result in higher prices, as the European Union itself concluded in a study on the potential effects of a Canada-EU trade agreement:

The Canadian trade balance would not necessarily benefit from IP provisions in CETA. Trade in specific goods, that are currently freely marketed and exported from Canada, could be adversely affected. For example, several Canadian companies brand and export their products with labels that could be considered as European geographical indications. These companies could lose market shares in domestic and foreign markets if they are forced to abandon their commercially significant labels. Conversely, it is unlikely that Canadian companies would significantly benefit from an increased protection of geographical indications in the European market. In sum, both Canadian exports and imports might be slightly and negatively impacted, but only in specific sectors.

The flip side of this is that Canadian negotiators may simply decide to trade off a bad deal on IP in exchange for perceived trade gains elsewhere. Given the way copyright has become politicized since the first time the Conservatives tried introducing a copyright-reform bill, this is a somewhat risky proposition. Then again, having a majority government makes passing such an agreement much, much, much easier than it would’ve been under a minority government.

The news from Canada makes what’s happening in Mexico even more interesting. While Canada is inching toward ACTA implementation, the Mexican Senate voted on July 20 not to ratify the ACTA (document is in Spanish, but there’s always Google Translate). Reasons cited include concerns about the lack of information provided to the Senate during the negotiations (illegal under Mexican law), the lack of due process under ACTA and the cost of requiring ISPs to monitor and enforce copyright infringement in a way that’s currently illegal under Mexican law and the Constitution, as well as other issues like net neutrality, censorship and privacy concerns. They also raise the concern that ACTA could lead to restrict both freedom and Internet usage, potentially broadening the “digital divide” and restricting the introduction of beneficial new technologies that would support the development of the information society (a key Mexican development goal).

As I noted earlier, many of these findings support the view that the Mexican telecommunications industry is making its voice heard, and that concerns about economic development have trumped the previously dominant view in the Mexican Senate regarding the need to increase copyright protection.

So, for the time being, anyway, ACTA is a dead letter in Mexico. (Though it could come back.)

The different approaches of the two countries serves as yet another reminder of the effectiveness of using trade agreements to force copyright reform in partner countries (next example: the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks, whose IP aspects have been described as "ACTA the sequel", only with a WTO-like enforcement mechanism). At the same time, however, Mexico’s current debate suggests the limit of this strategy. In situations where market access doesn’t exist as an incentive and where the domestic politics do not favour reform, it is much harder for one country to reform another’s copyright laws.

In other words, the Canada-EU trade talks allow the EU to link something Canada wants (market access) to something that the EU wants (Canadian IP reform along EU- and ACTA-friendly lines). Even though such reforms are not on their own beneficial to Canada for the reasons the EU report suggests above, there’s a pretty good chance they’ll happen, the result of a trade-off needed to get an agreement done.

In Mexico, no such linkage is happening, although it is part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks, along with the United States (Canada is not). And so ACTA is rejected, the victim of the mobilization of domestic constituencies.

Which brings us to the big question. Most major countries now have relatively open access to each other’s markets, so market-access is less of a problem for most countries than it was even two decades ago. Copyright laws, meanwhile, are regularly undermined by things like technological change. In a world where the IP powers can’t offer countries improved market access, but where they still want stronger copyright protection, how likely is continued copyright harmonization? If we want to predict the future, do we look to Mexico’s rejection of ACTA, or to the Canada-EU trade talks? Maybe I'm underestimating the appetite for more trade agreements?

The difficulty of looking inward

Reactions to the horrifying bombing and shootings in Norway have demonstrated yet again how hard it is for us to acknowledge that our own societies might have their own dark side. This is nothing new: we all have the tendency to play up threats from without (Osama bin Laden) and play down threats from within (Timothy McVeigh).

Most obvious has been the kneejerk tendency to claim this was an act of Islamic terrorism. I first read about the attacks on my Facebook feed, where the New York Times’ Nicholas Kristof, without any evidence, wrote, “Looks like Al Qaeda.” The Atlantic’s James Fallows, Ta-Nehisi Coates and Steve Clemons also rightly take The Washington Post and writer Jennifer Rubin to task for writing the same thing in much more detail. Kristof, Rubin and the Post have yet to retract/apologize for what they wrote, although Kristof has since acknowledged on Facebook that the alleged murderer was actually a right-wing extremist.

That’s all par for the course. I think we all have a tendency to jump to conclusions. Rather, the more fascinating thing about people’s reactions is how the facts of the case – the suspect is a Norwegian (white!), Christian, right-wing extremist whose beliefs are more in line with Mark Steyn than bin Laden  – are incorporated into the widespread belief that Islamic terrorists pose an existential threat to the West.

Case 1: James Fallows, who shares an email from a “Norwegian friend whom my wife and I have known since he came to the U.S. for graduate school in the 1970s.” This friend, whose letter is run without comment, suggests that “we are seeing is a mutation of Al Quaeda / Jihadist tactics, to domestic political action and the surprise is that it happened in peaceful Norway. (Yes, there was McVeigh and Oklahoma city, but it feels different, and maybe it is different just because it happened before 9/11).”

There’s a lot in here, though the letter is interesting more for what it tells us about how the writer perceives the world than what it says about the actual event.

Start with the assertion that we’re seeing a “mutation of Al Qaeda / Jihadist tactics to domestic political action.” Can we really call the bombing of government buildings and the mass murder civilians to make a political point “Jihadist tactics”? That countless groups throughout history have used such tactics to further domestic political aims suggest that he’s just plain wrong about the novelty of such attacks, in Europe if not in Norway.

Paul Wells links us to Dan Gardner, who reminds us that non-Islamic terror groups are much more active in Europe than Al Qaeda and its sympathizers.

The overwhelming majority of the [failed, foiled or successful terrorist] attacks [in Europe in 2009] - 237 of 294 – were carried out by separatist groups, such as the Basque ETA. A further 40 terrorists schemes were pinned on leftist and/or anarchist terrorists. Rightists were responsible for four attacks. Single-issue groups were behind two attacks, while responsibility for a further 10 was not clear.

Bombing government buildings and murdering civilians to make a political point, or the desire to do so, is a commonplace among extremist groups, including domestic groups. Full stop.

Which brings us to why, for this person, this attack “feels different” from “McVeigh and [the] Oklahoma City” bombing. It can’t be the facts of the case: McVeigh bombed a building and killed a lot of people, too. He, too, was a Christian, right-wing homegrown extremist. My guess is it feels different because of our very human tendency to attribute evil acts to outsiders.

His comments put me in mind of a Canadian friend, living in Japan, whose apartment was robbed. (Luckily, he had hidden his money in a copy of Marx’s Das Kapital, which the thieves for some reason left behind.) As I remember the story, the police were sure that foreigners were to blame: they were shocked when some Japanese kids confessed to the robbery.

To non-Japanese it’s neither surprising nor a sweeping indictment of their society that some Japanese kids were to blame for the break-in. No society is free of criminals, just as no society is free of violent racists. I’ve never been there, but I would be shocked if Norway were any different. Suggesting that this alleged murderer is “an individual host for the Al Qaeda gene” is akin to claiming he had been infected by some foreign virus, contaminating the otherwise-pure body politic of Norway.

I don’t know how helpful this line of thinking is, considering that domestic political violence is nothing new (Canada has experienced its share of "homegrown" terrorist bombings, from the 1970 October Crisis in Quebec and the 1985 Air India bombings to the more recent bombings of oil pipelines in Alberta). It may be easier – and in these nationalistic times, more popular – to condemn evil foreign influences, imagined or otherwise, than to confront “homegrown” problems. But the ability to do so is a sign of national strength, not weakness.

(And I haven’t even gotten into his suggestion that this might not have happened if there had been an ultra-right-wing party there to moderate the alleged attacker’s views, since the party would moderate its views in search of votes. Exactly how does that work in a system prone to coalition governments?)

My thoughts go out to Norway, and the families of the victims of this atrocity.