I don’t quite know where to start with John Degen’s attack in the Globe and Mail on the decision of 26 educational institutions (and counting) to opt out of Access Copyright (which collects royalties for Canadian authors mainly from Canadian educational institutions, after taking a healthy cut for administrative purposes). It’s an opinion piece, and he’s expressing his own perspective as a writer (although he certainly doesn’t speak for all writers when he expresses his admiration for AC). But as someone who’s followed this issue for the past year, though not as in depth as some (Howard Knopf is the go-to guy for a blow-by-blow account of this unwinding debacle), I can’t say that I recognize the universities-want-to-stop-paying-writers picture that he paints.
Fair to say, I think, that the Access Copyright-universities battle royale is nowhere near as one-sided as Degen suggests.
What’s missing? A fair accounting would have mentioned that the interim tariff that AC was seeking would have sent university budgets skyrocketing. Knopf reports that the University of British Columbia from $650,000 per year to $2 million per year. That’s a pretty good reason to reconsider using Access Copyright.
I would’ve also expected to read that Access Copyright was seeking (according to the University of Northern British Columbia) to “identify provision of links to resources and displaying resources on computer screens as ‘copies’.” Oh, and to keep the system running, UNBC says “The new tariff would also require that UNBC provides Access Copyright with unrestricted access to University secure networks, systems and records (e-mails, etc.) to conduct annual surveys of copying activities undertaken by faculty, staff, and students. This particular term is not only extremely invasive and labour intensive but UNBC also considers this unacceptable. We cannot condone this level of intrusion into our operations” (emphasis rightly added by Knopf). Again, that doesn’t make Access Copyright look too good.
(I’d also throw in my own annoyance, as a research and a writer of sorts, that Access Copyright has been allowed effectively to define what is meant by fair dealing – copying about 10% of a work, IIRC. That’s an arbitrary choice reflected nowhere in the Copyright Act.)
As for Degen’s assertion that the decision of these universities (most of Canada’s largest) to withdraw from Access Copyright “represents an unprecedented attack on academic freedom” by banning “certain uses of certain Canadian works [i.e., those covered by Access Copyright] from campus,” two points. First, the actual size of AC’s repertoire is disputed (UNBC claims it’s quite small). So how much of a loss this is remains to be seen. Second, it's not like these materials aren't already available through other licences held by universities. And we still have a fair dealing exception in the Copyright Act. I’ll leave the explanation of how that works to Michael Geist (this also links to a good FAQ on what opting out means for universities). Nothing's been banned. Throwing language like that around doesn't do your argument any favours.
The biggest problem with Degen’s opinion piece isn’t really his fault. Obviously this is a high-stakes, emotionally charged issue that highlights the upheaval that digital technologies are causing in the publishing industry. As far as I can tell, the Globe and Mail has done little-to-no reporting on an issue that has the potential to add millions of dollars to already-stretched university budgets, increase tuition and disrupt the way that many Canadian writers get paid.
But instead of providing readers with reportage that can allow them to situate Degen (and Knopf, and Geist, and me), they just throw Degen’s opinion out there. That’s a highly irresponsible act of policy bomb throwing from Canada’s supposed paper of record.
Showing posts with label copyright. Show all posts
Showing posts with label copyright. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 17, 2011
Monday, August 15, 2011
Google and the evil that lobbyists do?
I'm looking forward to reading Robert Levine's Free Ride: How the Internet Is Destroying the Culture Business and How the Culture Business Can Fight Back, although I'll probably wait until our library here at ANU orders it. At $28.95 for a digital download (only $5 less than the hardcover), no one will be able to accuse Levine or his publisher of looking for a free ride. They have, however, priced themselves out of my market (too-high prices, ironically, being one of the main causes of unauthorized downloads, according to the definitive survey on the subject).
In particular, I hope he goes into a lot of detail on Google's attempts to influence public policy, as Chris Castle's favourable review of Levine's book seems to suggest:
First off, all interest groups lobby for their preferred policies. The most direct way to lobby for your policies in Washington is to hire lobbyists to provide Congresspeople with money and research that supports your cause. On Capitol Hill, the content industries are widely acknowledged as the reigning champs at influencing policy. They've been very successful at wielding arguments (and money) to support their position. As for Google, they're still new at this game (the company isn't even 10 years old), but learning fast. In the second quarter of 2011, Google spent US$2.06 million on lobbyists. That's a lot, but the Recording Industry of America, in the first quarter of 2011, spent pretty much the same: US$2.1 million.
Second, lobbying involves battling to frame the debate, and everybody does it. Against academics like Lawrence Lessig and lobby groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, you have well-established groups like the Motion Picture Association of America. Google's relationship with academics (imagine!) like Lessig and agitators (which I say with respect; agitators drive debates) like the EFF is dictated largely by their position as upstarts. They're trying to promote a view different from accepted Washington orthodoxy. Right now, the dominant view of copyright on Capitol Hill is very favourable to the cultural industries; the EFF/Lessig/Google Axis of Infringement faces an uphill battle. For example, the U.S. position in talks like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership is very pro-stronger copyright and cultural industries.
So, sure, Google is flexing its economic muscles, but it's not like they're going up against underfunded ingenues. And it's certainly not like they're running the show.
When I see Google's attempts to influence the copyright debate in Washington and elsewhere, I see an upstart group attempting to break past several entrenched lobbies to promote its point of view. When I look at copyright policymaking, I see a process that continues to be dominated by cultural industries that have been "fight[ing] back" against technological change since the Clinton White House issued its National Information Infrastructure White Paper on Intellectual Property in 1995. In short, I see politics as usual.
And copyright is nothing if not political.
A few other thoughts:
In particular, I hope he goes into a lot of detail on Google's attempts to influence public policy, as Chris Castle's favourable review of Levine's book seems to suggest:
One of the truly significant themes in the book is how Levine has laid out in one place all the different ways that Google influences public policy around the world. This is done through his discussion of the execuprofs, groups like the EFF and Google’s massive contributions to Creative Commons, as well as a history of the YouTube case. I mean the Viacom case against Google–sorry. (Saying “the YouTube case” alone is like saying “my brother is in the Army, maybe you know him.”)As someone whose whole dissertation essentially came down to studying what groups influence copyright policy in North America and how they do it, this really caught my eye. I'd certainly agree that Google is lobbying for their point of view, but I find it hard to get that worked up about it, especially once we put Google's actions in perspective.
First off, all interest groups lobby for their preferred policies. The most direct way to lobby for your policies in Washington is to hire lobbyists to provide Congresspeople with money and research that supports your cause. On Capitol Hill, the content industries are widely acknowledged as the reigning champs at influencing policy. They've been very successful at wielding arguments (and money) to support their position. As for Google, they're still new at this game (the company isn't even 10 years old), but learning fast. In the second quarter of 2011, Google spent US$2.06 million on lobbyists. That's a lot, but the Recording Industry of America, in the first quarter of 2011, spent pretty much the same: US$2.1 million.
Second, lobbying involves battling to frame the debate, and everybody does it. Against academics like Lawrence Lessig and lobby groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, you have well-established groups like the Motion Picture Association of America. Google's relationship with academics (imagine!) like Lessig and agitators (which I say with respect; agitators drive debates) like the EFF is dictated largely by their position as upstarts. They're trying to promote a view different from accepted Washington orthodoxy. Right now, the dominant view of copyright on Capitol Hill is very favourable to the cultural industries; the EFF/Lessig/Google Axis of Infringement faces an uphill battle. For example, the U.S. position in talks like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership is very pro-stronger copyright and cultural industries.
So, sure, Google is flexing its economic muscles, but it's not like they're going up against underfunded ingenues. And it's certainly not like they're running the show.
When I see Google's attempts to influence the copyright debate in Washington and elsewhere, I see an upstart group attempting to break past several entrenched lobbies to promote its point of view. When I look at copyright policymaking, I see a process that continues to be dominated by cultural industries that have been "fight[ing] back" against technological change since the Clinton White House issued its National Information Infrastructure White Paper on Intellectual Property in 1995. In short, I see politics as usual.
And copyright is nothing if not political.
A few other thoughts:
- I'll be very curious to see how Levine recommends that the culture business (by which he seems to mean the companies that publish and distribute books, music, etc., and not the creators themselves) "fight back." I think pretty much everyone would agree that what they've been doing for the past 15 or so years hasn't been very successful in terms of staving off economic contraction.
- I also hope his book includes a discussion about how copyright (and all forms of cultural regulation) and technology favours certain types of creation over others (see, Beastie Boys, Paul's Boutique). In other words, that different types of cultural products get produced under different regimes is a fact of life.
- In his Guardian column touting his book, Levine doesn't seem to differentiate between the cultural industries and actual creators. The cultural industries are a means to the end of helping creators publish and distribute their works, and while historically economies have scale have made them necessary for creators to get their stuff out there, the two sides often have conflicting interests. Similarly, the objective of copyright historically has been to promote the creation and dissemination of creative works, not to support a particular industrial model.
- Does anybody know why Levine seems to have changed the title of his book from Free Ride: How Digital Parasites are Destroying the Culture Business, and How the Culture Business Can Fight Back? Calling someone a parasite (especially since many of these "parasites" are the culture industries' customers) is a pretty sure way to preempt a civil conversation.
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
The copyright hammer
It might just be me, but I've noticed an increase (from about zero) in articles and reports on the way that copyright restricts people's access to information and cultural works, with sometimes negative consequences. This morning, I stumbled across a series of articles in the U.S. Chronicle of Higher Education, titled "The Copyright Rebellion." They tackle the crucial issue of how copyright law actually interferes with teachers' ability to teach and students' ability to learn by making it unaffordable for professors to place copyrighted works on their curricula, or for music students to play works by composers who have been dead for decades.
Highly recommended, and a good reminder that the purpose of copyright is to promote both creation and dissemination. While it deals with U.S. copyright law, and Canadian copyright law is somewhat different (fair use in the U.S., fair dealing in Canada, for example), the general principles do apply in both cases. Whether copyright actually does promote creation is an open issue for which the evidence isn't all that favourable, as I've noted before. But there's no question that it restricts dissemination, as these articles amply demonstrate.
Supreme Court Takes Up Scholars' Rights
Out of Fear, Colleges Lock Books and Images Away From Scholars
Pushing Back Against Legal Threats by Putting Fair Use Forward (also has a list of links to articles on copyright and fair use for academics and librarians)
What You Don't Know About Copyright, but Should (U.S. focus)
Highly recommended, and a good reminder that the purpose of copyright is to promote both creation and dissemination. While it deals with U.S. copyright law, and Canadian copyright law is somewhat different (fair use in the U.S., fair dealing in Canada, for example), the general principles do apply in both cases. Whether copyright actually does promote creation is an open issue for which the evidence isn't all that favourable, as I've noted before. But there's no question that it restricts dissemination, as these articles amply demonstrate.
Supreme Court Takes Up Scholars' Rights
Out of Fear, Colleges Lock Books and Images Away From Scholars
Pushing Back Against Legal Threats by Putting Fair Use Forward (also has a list of links to articles on copyright and fair use for academics and librarians)
What You Don't Know About Copyright, but Should (U.S. focus)
Saturday, April 30, 2011
WikiLeaks cables: U.S. behind drive for Canadian copyright reform (who knew?)
I see that WikiLeaks has finally released the cables from the U.S. embassy in Ottawa. They’ll make for some fine reading as I prepare for my thesis defence (May 26 at Carleton University, Loeb Building A631 at 2 pm – bring your friends!). For now, you can catch up with some analysis from Geist (here (main one), here, here, here, here, and here) and Techdirt. Zeropaid also has a nice opinion piece on the whole release (h/t Russell McOrmond).
I’m happy to note that the cables, at first glance, seem to corroborate my dissertation’s argument as it relates to Canada (summarized here), so that’s good. Two things stand out to me.
First, one of my dissertation’s main points is that the United States usually can only get its way on reforming another country’s copyright policies if it offers something that the other country wants. True enough, but as the cables also suggest, a country can attempt to use the offer of copyright reform to try to get the United States to move on an issue of interest to it. In one cable, Canada says that U.S. movement on regulatory cooperation as part of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) was what it wanted in exchange for Canadian copyright reform.
These two points are mostly saying the same thing, but the second emphasizes that there can be a significant amount of give and take on such policy debates, even on an issue of great importance to the larger country. Whether it works or not is another issue (the U.S. here saw Canadian attempts to link copyright to an unrelated issue as a stalling tactic. That they would comment negatively on such a linkage also suggests that linkage remains the exception, not the rule, in Canada-U.S. relations).
Second, in reading these cables and others, I’m continually struck by how open the U.S. system of government is. I’d go so far as to say that the great value in the WikiLeaks cables isn’t in what they tell us about the United States, but what they tell us about our own, very secretive government. Going far afield of copyright, the Tunisian revolution was partly sparked by revelations not about what the United States was doing in Tunisia, but about what the Tunisian government was getting up to.
I’m happy to note that the cables, at first glance, seem to corroborate my dissertation’s argument as it relates to Canada (summarized here), so that’s good. Two things stand out to me.
First, one of my dissertation’s main points is that the United States usually can only get its way on reforming another country’s copyright policies if it offers something that the other country wants. True enough, but as the cables also suggest, a country can attempt to use the offer of copyright reform to try to get the United States to move on an issue of interest to it. In one cable, Canada says that U.S. movement on regulatory cooperation as part of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) was what it wanted in exchange for Canadian copyright reform.
These two points are mostly saying the same thing, but the second emphasizes that there can be a significant amount of give and take on such policy debates, even on an issue of great importance to the larger country. Whether it works or not is another issue (the U.S. here saw Canadian attempts to link copyright to an unrelated issue as a stalling tactic. That they would comment negatively on such a linkage also suggests that linkage remains the exception, not the rule, in Canada-U.S. relations).
Second, in reading these cables and others, I’m continually struck by how open the U.S. system of government is. I’d go so far as to say that the great value in the WikiLeaks cables isn’t in what they tell us about the United States, but what they tell us about our own, very secretive government. Going far afield of copyright, the Tunisian revolution was partly sparked by revelations not about what the United States was doing in Tunisia, but about what the Tunisian government was getting up to.
Monday, March 7, 2011
The ideology of copyright
Peter Nowak is currently running a series of posts offering predictions about the future of science and techology, including weather control (!). The whole series (actually, the entire blog) is worth reading, but today he has a post about the future of copyright, an issue of some interest to me. It's titled "2021: The move to worldwide copyright," but I wonder if a better title wouldn't be "The move to worldwide licensing." I'm pretty fixated on copyright these days, not so much on licensing, so I'd be happy to hear from anyone with an opinion on the subject. Any thoughts?
Anyway, I've posted a couple of lengthy comments there, including one in response to some typically insightful remarks by Russell McOrmond.
The comments allowed me to put to paper something I've been thinking about for a while: what would it take for people, companies and governments to move beyond a fixation on copyright toward a focus on what copyright is supposed to do, namely regulate the market in creative works. Competition, I think, isn't enough:
Read the whole post here.
Anyway, I've posted a couple of lengthy comments there, including one in response to some typically insightful remarks by Russell McOrmond.
The comments allowed me to put to paper something I've been thinking about for a while: what would it take for people, companies and governments to move beyond a fixation on copyright toward a focus on what copyright is supposed to do, namely regulate the market in creative works. Competition, I think, isn't enough:
When it comes to copyright, we’re dealing with a centuries-old policy that is rooted in two core Western beliefs: property and the individual. The major international copyright institutions (WIPO, TRIPS, and now ACTA) are devoted to promoting copyright. It’s so deeply ingrained that people talk as if it’s an end unto itself, rather than one specific tool for regulating markets in creative works. Once people in power start talking about copyright as a tool that should be judged on its effects, then change will become more likely. My biggest hope for the copyright debate is that it will one day shift from the realm of philosophy and legal theory to that of empirical economics. I’m still waiting.
At this point in time, it’s quite obvious that publishers, the other content industries and content creators who profit from the current copyright system believe as a matter of faith that copying is stealing. Hence the lobbying and the legal battles. A decade of bad press and faltering business models haven’t changed that. As far as I can tell, there seems to be very little evidence to suggest that this will change anytime soon. It has nothing with anyone being stupid. One’s ideologies change very slowly, if at all, since they’re at the core of our self-perception. It’s not surprising that companies, run by humans, leave money on the table all the time and often commit what seems like suicide rather than change with the times. I’m not going to make any predictions, but I’d suggest that taking ideology into account may complicate the story.
Read the whole post here.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
The Value of Music, Beatles Edition
For sale on the Mexico City Metro: Two hundred and thirty-seven Beatles MP3s on one CD-ROM for 10 pesos (about 95 cents Canadian). As someone who understands the importance of The Beatles to pop music but wouldn’t cross the street to hear one of their songs, that sounds about right. Maybe a bit too high. (I passed.)
It did make me wonder whether the prospective set of customers for a bootleg CD of The Beatles back catalogue overlap with those for a Beatles box set. How about with those for authorized MP3s, if they ever get around to releasing them? Not being a Beatles fan, I can't imagine purchasing any of them at any price, but given that unauthorized Beatles MP3s are surely available somewhere online already (not being a fan, I can’t be bothered to check), and that presumably anyone with an interest in The Bealtes would have already ripped their own CDs to their computer, what would motivate someone to wait years for the authorized MP3s?
Ten pesos is also an interesting price when you consider that those 10 pesos has to cover the costs of production (buying the blank CDs, and the computers to burn them) and distribution and labour costs (the network of hawkers selling the CDs) and still make a profit. Whoever sells these CDs must be making some money, since you can't go five minutes on the subway without being interrupted by a hawker pitching The Beatles or the Greatest Hits of the 80s or whatever.
By the way, I just purchased an e-book version of Landes and Posner's The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law from the Sony E-bookstore. For about $60. I leave the link between the Beatles and Landes and Posner as an exercise for the reader.
It did make me wonder whether the prospective set of customers for a bootleg CD of The Beatles back catalogue overlap with those for a Beatles box set. How about with those for authorized MP3s, if they ever get around to releasing them? Not being a Beatles fan, I can't imagine purchasing any of them at any price, but given that unauthorized Beatles MP3s are surely available somewhere online already (not being a fan, I can’t be bothered to check), and that presumably anyone with an interest in The Bealtes would have already ripped their own CDs to their computer, what would motivate someone to wait years for the authorized MP3s?
Ten pesos is also an interesting price when you consider that those 10 pesos has to cover the costs of production (buying the blank CDs, and the computers to burn them) and distribution and labour costs (the network of hawkers selling the CDs) and still make a profit. Whoever sells these CDs must be making some money, since you can't go five minutes on the subway without being interrupted by a hawker pitching The Beatles or the Greatest Hits of the 80s or whatever.
By the way, I just purchased an e-book version of Landes and Posner's The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law from the Sony E-bookstore. For about $60. I leave the link between the Beatles and Landes and Posner as an exercise for the reader.
Friday, November 20, 2009
In Mexico, creators and industry are getting together
Very interesting news here in Mexico. El Universal and others (all sources are in Spanish) are reporting that over 30 copyright-related groups are coming together to form the Coalición por el acceso legal a la cultura (Coalition for legal access to culture). According to composer and coalition co-president Armando Manzanero (rough translation): “We are uniting so that no one steals a song, a book or a picture, so that everyone pays royalties to the artists.”
What’s most significant is that this coalition unites artists’ collective societies and unions with those on the corporate side, such as the Asociación Productora de Fonogramas (the only industry group mentioned by name in the articles, though I understand from people I’ve talked with that the coalition basically includes everyone traditionally involved in copyright). Furthermore, it has the blessing of the two main government oversight bodies, INDAUTOR and IMPI, as well as the head of the main congressional oversight committee, la Comisión de Cultura de la Cámara de Diputados, Kenia López.
Generally speaking, the coalition favours stronger copyright laws (and enforcement). Their initial projects include working toward a copyright levy and a regime for ISP liability, since right now there is no specific Mexican law governing ISP liability. I also understand that they are interested in getting the government to enforce their copyright laws by granting them ex officio authority, meaning that the government would not have to wait for an infringement complaint to take action against suspected infringers. (I think this is the big one, since it moves the onus for enforcement from the private sector to the public sector and, thus, the taxpayer.)
Getting Ready for the Future
This coalition comes in advance of what will likely be a major reform of Mexican copyright law in a few years’ time. The last major reform to the Mexican Ley Federal de Derecho de Autor was in 1997, mainly (but not completely) to implement Mexico’s obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement; it was modified in 2003, notably to increase the standard copyright term to a world-leading life of the author plus 100 years (at the request of Mexican authors’ groups – not all copyright reforms are driven by American industry).
The upcoming legislative battle will likely pit coalition members against Mexican Internet Service Providers, with the coalition wanting the ISPs to undertake some form of policing of their networks and the ISPs trying to minimize their legal obligations. Having a coalition allows these disparate groups to work out their differences (and there will be differences) in private before dealing with the ISPs, and to present a unified front to the authorities, giving their conclusions a lot of weight.
Issue Framing
The coalition is also a savvy move in the battle for control of how the issue is framed. In countries like Canada and the United States, there is a growing appreciation that artists and distributors/producers sometimes have conflicting interests when it comes to copyright. It is no longer identified solely with authors, but rather as a commercial right whose benefits accrue mainly to large corporations. In contrast, the Mexican copyright discourse is still dominated by the Continental idea of copyright (or, rather, derecho de autor – author’s right) and is seen as a tool for the protection of the national culture (whereas in Canada, the claim that copyright serves mainly foreign, i.e., American, interests, has a lot of currency). This narrative is reinforced by the role of collective societies as providers of social programs to artists and as their main representatives in the legislative process. Having all these groups under one roof reinforces the idea of copyright as an author’s right, rather than as a commercial right.
Getting Ahead of the Public
The coalition is also getting ahead of another group that has proven increasingly vocal in places like Canada: the user community. While the past several years have seen an astonishing politicization of copyright in Canada, there is to date no evidence of a similar groundswell in Mexico. (According to one of my interview subjects, this book, released in July 2009, was intended partly as a way to kickstart a public debate over copyright in Mexico.)
Part of this lack of interest can be attributed to the low level of Internet penetration in Mexico. This won’t always be the case, however; as more Mexicans go online, they are likely to become more aware of how they are affected by copyright law. In the face of a well-organized coalition, it will be harder for consumers to organize effectively.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Tepito!
As I mentioned above, I'm in Mexico to study Mexican copyright policy (I'm actually comparing the implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties by Canada, the United States and Mexico to see what it can tell us about North American governance, but I'll save that for later). A few weeks ago, I went with my neighbour and his girlfriend to Tepito. If you're interested in copyright, then you've heard of Tepito. If you're a political junkie in Washington, you go to Capitol Hill; if you're into copyright, you gotta check out Tepito.
It's an infamous thorn in the side of the copyright industries and the Mexican government (Outside of copyright, it has a colourful history). The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) - the main lobby group for American copyright companies - claimed in 2008 that Tepito accounted for "65% of the pirate music product manufactured and distributed" in Mexico. Thanks to its deep connections with organized crime, it's also a no-go area for law enforcement.
Based on what I'd read about the place, I wouldn't have gone without my Mexican neighbour, but once there, it's an eye-opener (and it didn't feel too dangerous, but I may have been oblivious). That it's a veritable warren of stalls makes it familiar to anyone who's ever been to the night market in Chaing Mai, or countless other places throughout Asia and Latin America. I didn't see any CDs being burned, but I did see hundreds of DVD covers in the process of being prepared for assembly. Anyone who's interested in copyright and how it interacts with the real economy should definitely check it out.
Some thoughts and observations:
Free marketers would love Tepito. It's remarkably complex and has developed in the absence of government regulation. Many vendors specialize (some exclusively offered porn, Mexican movies, and arthouse flicks). They may also have overcome the quality problem associated with pirated materials. According to a professor I interviewed for my field research, many vendors offer you the opportunity to return the DVD if you're not satisfied with the quality. To me, this suggests that these vendors have developed roots in their community.
What's also interesting, for a lapsed economist, is the complementary (or symbiotic) economy that has developed around Tepito. Much (or most) of the stuff sold there may be stolen, but there are also a lot of vendors selling food (a lot of which looked quite tasty) and crafts. There is also a market (or more than one; I was unclear where Tepito ended and the others began) near Tepito; I'd bet that one depends on the other.
Price competition. Seeing the low prices for DVDs (three to five dollars Canadian) made me think that the really interesting question for copyright aficionados is not how to eliminate copyright violators, but why people still buy full-price CDs and DVDs and go to movies, when substitutes are available at a fraction of the price. Economically, it makes zero sense. I'd love to see any work that's been done on this (I've been too focused on the philosophy of copyright and the Internet treaties to be of much use here, unfortunately).
Full-price DVDs may be a status symbol: a form of conspicuous consumption unavailable to the majority of Mexicans, 50% of whom live below the poverty line. So what you have is two markets: the rich and the poor. The professor I mentioned earlier said he thought his students bought so much bootlegged material because while they've been trained to consume, being students, they lacked the means to buy authorized goods.
Extend this argument to the entire economy and you've got a situation in which an illegal market may not necessarily be a bad thing for the content industries. Cheap knockoffs may get people interested in consuming these status products; once they make enough money, they might switch to the more expensive legit (status) copies.
It also made me wonder what would happen if the copyright industries slashed their prices to compete with the bootleggers, and what the industry would look like at those prices. I'm going to have to do some hunting for papers on the economics of piracy. I'd love to know what their profit margins are.
Grist for a post-doc, maybe.
Availability. Contrary to what you read, you can't buy everything in Tepito. I looked high and low for a copy of Star Trek - for research purposes, of course - and I couldn't find a copy anywhere. I saw it on the streets for the first time two days ago. Wonder if they took any special precautions to keep it from leaking out.
The future. Mexican Internet penetration rates are still quite low. It would be interesting to come back in ten years and see if the commercial market for illicit CDs and DVDs had been replaced by non-commercial (potentially illicit, depending on what the law says at the time) file sharing by Net-savvy Mexicans. Tepito's days may be numbered, not by law enforcement, but by technology.
Friday, November 6, 2009
The Leaked ACTA Documents: What Next?
I had originally intended my first post to be more introductory (PhD student in political science at Carleton University in Ottawa, writing a dissertation on implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization Internet treaties in Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, former economist and reporter, currently working out of Mexico City trying to finish my dissertation so I can rejoin the workforce), but instead I’m going to jump right into what I hope will be regular postings related mainly to my academic work: copyright policy and North American regional integration. Comments always welcome.
I’ve been experiencing a bit of déjà vu reading Michael Geist’s recent postings on the leaked Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) which, despite its name, seems to have at least as much to do with copyright as counterfeiting (Geist has a link to a leaked description of the parts of ACTA related to ISP liability and technological protection measures). The secret negotiations among a group of (mostly) developed nations attempting to set a global standard that goes far beyond the existing international treaties, the leaks that have sparked outrage among activist groups, the negotiations outside the subject’s traditional fora: what we have here is practically a repeat of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI: OECD page; Wikipedia) in the late 1990s.
As a pup reporter for a small Toronto-based Catholic social-justice newspaper (how’re those for some loaded labels?), I filed many a story on the opposition to the MAI, and I remember how activists claimed victory when it was shelved. For those of you who don't recall the MAI, it was like the Battle of Seattle, only about global investment rules. Its defeat was seen as the first expression of what has come to be called global civil society.
For those concerned with the potentially harmful effects of an ACTA, which could include a three-strikes rule for repeat copyright infringers and a notice-and-takedown regime for ISPs, there are some important lessons to be learned from the MAI experience, the most obvious to me being:
Lesson #1: The negotiating forum matters. This is the big difference between the ACTA and the MAI. The MAI was negotiated under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD, and not the recently established WTO, was chosen as the negotiating body because it was felt that its limited, relatively homogenous membership (currently 30, mainly industrialized, countries) would make it easier to conclude an investment treaty. This treaty could then be presented to the rest of the world as a fait accompli without the bother of having to negotiate with countries whose interests may not be in sync with the richer OECD countries.
The one flaw in this plan was that the OECD was working under consensus rules: if one country objected, then the whole treaty would not proceed. Indeed, while activists can take a lot of the credit for the eventual demise of the MAI, it was actually the French government’s decision not to pursue the MAI that actually killed it but good.
The big question for ACTA opponents (and proponents, for that matter) is whether the talks are vulnerable to a country pulling a France before the end of negotiations next year. I don't know the answer to that question, mainly because (what with the secrecy and all) the terms under which the treaty is being negotiated are not readily available. But it would seem that so long as the United States, Japan and the European Union are on board (the U.S. isn't going anywhere; don't know about Japan or the EU), it doesn't matter if most other countries stay or go. If the United States can go into Iraq with Britain, Australia and Moldova as its main allies and call it a coalition, they could still negotiate a treaty with bit players and call it a new world standard.
So ACTA opponents will have to take into account the likely success of a treaty and plan accordingly. The basic strategy of the MAI protesters seems to remain valid here: international information coordination (the easy part) and domestic political pressure (the hard part). The real battle will probably take place country-by-country, first over whether to withdraw (Howard Knopf argues for walking away) and then over the treaty’s implementation.
While this likely will make the ACTA political debate different (and more difficult for opponents) than the MAI debate, the final outcome is not predetermined. Treaties can be modified before they are signed, and then they have to be implemented, and then enforced. As has been demonstrated by Canada’s inability to implement its obligations under the WIPO Internet treaties, and the U.S. refusal to implement the Kyoto Accord (which it signed), just because a country signs a treaty does not mean that it’s going to implement it.
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Showing posts with label copyright. Show all posts
Showing posts with label copyright. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 17, 2011
Access Copyright: The Globe and Mail's One-Sided Story
I don’t quite know where to start with John Degen’s attack in the Globe and Mail on the decision of 26 educational institutions (and counting) to opt out of Access Copyright (which collects royalties for Canadian authors mainly from Canadian educational institutions, after taking a healthy cut for administrative purposes). It’s an opinion piece, and he’s expressing his own perspective as a writer (although he certainly doesn’t speak for all writers when he expresses his admiration for AC). But as someone who’s followed this issue for the past year, though not as in depth as some (Howard Knopf is the go-to guy for a blow-by-blow account of this unwinding debacle), I can’t say that I recognize the universities-want-to-stop-paying-writers picture that he paints.
Fair to say, I think, that the Access Copyright-universities battle royale is nowhere near as one-sided as Degen suggests.
What’s missing? A fair accounting would have mentioned that the interim tariff that AC was seeking would have sent university budgets skyrocketing. Knopf reports that the University of British Columbia from $650,000 per year to $2 million per year. That’s a pretty good reason to reconsider using Access Copyright.
I would’ve also expected to read that Access Copyright was seeking (according to the University of Northern British Columbia) to “identify provision of links to resources and displaying resources on computer screens as ‘copies’.” Oh, and to keep the system running, UNBC says “The new tariff would also require that UNBC provides Access Copyright with unrestricted access to University secure networks, systems and records (e-mails, etc.) to conduct annual surveys of copying activities undertaken by faculty, staff, and students. This particular term is not only extremely invasive and labour intensive but UNBC also considers this unacceptable. We cannot condone this level of intrusion into our operations” (emphasis rightly added by Knopf). Again, that doesn’t make Access Copyright look too good.
(I’d also throw in my own annoyance, as a research and a writer of sorts, that Access Copyright has been allowed effectively to define what is meant by fair dealing – copying about 10% of a work, IIRC. That’s an arbitrary choice reflected nowhere in the Copyright Act.)
As for Degen’s assertion that the decision of these universities (most of Canada’s largest) to withdraw from Access Copyright “represents an unprecedented attack on academic freedom” by banning “certain uses of certain Canadian works [i.e., those covered by Access Copyright] from campus,” two points. First, the actual size of AC’s repertoire is disputed (UNBC claims it’s quite small). So how much of a loss this is remains to be seen. Second, it's not like these materials aren't already available through other licences held by universities. And we still have a fair dealing exception in the Copyright Act. I’ll leave the explanation of how that works to Michael Geist (this also links to a good FAQ on what opting out means for universities). Nothing's been banned. Throwing language like that around doesn't do your argument any favours.
The biggest problem with Degen’s opinion piece isn’t really his fault. Obviously this is a high-stakes, emotionally charged issue that highlights the upheaval that digital technologies are causing in the publishing industry. As far as I can tell, the Globe and Mail has done little-to-no reporting on an issue that has the potential to add millions of dollars to already-stretched university budgets, increase tuition and disrupt the way that many Canadian writers get paid.
But instead of providing readers with reportage that can allow them to situate Degen (and Knopf, and Geist, and me), they just throw Degen’s opinion out there. That’s a highly irresponsible act of policy bomb throwing from Canada’s supposed paper of record.
Fair to say, I think, that the Access Copyright-universities battle royale is nowhere near as one-sided as Degen suggests.
What’s missing? A fair accounting would have mentioned that the interim tariff that AC was seeking would have sent university budgets skyrocketing. Knopf reports that the University of British Columbia from $650,000 per year to $2 million per year. That’s a pretty good reason to reconsider using Access Copyright.
I would’ve also expected to read that Access Copyright was seeking (according to the University of Northern British Columbia) to “identify provision of links to resources and displaying resources on computer screens as ‘copies’.” Oh, and to keep the system running, UNBC says “The new tariff would also require that UNBC provides Access Copyright with unrestricted access to University secure networks, systems and records (e-mails, etc.) to conduct annual surveys of copying activities undertaken by faculty, staff, and students. This particular term is not only extremely invasive and labour intensive but UNBC also considers this unacceptable. We cannot condone this level of intrusion into our operations” (emphasis rightly added by Knopf). Again, that doesn’t make Access Copyright look too good.
(I’d also throw in my own annoyance, as a research and a writer of sorts, that Access Copyright has been allowed effectively to define what is meant by fair dealing – copying about 10% of a work, IIRC. That’s an arbitrary choice reflected nowhere in the Copyright Act.)
As for Degen’s assertion that the decision of these universities (most of Canada’s largest) to withdraw from Access Copyright “represents an unprecedented attack on academic freedom” by banning “certain uses of certain Canadian works [i.e., those covered by Access Copyright] from campus,” two points. First, the actual size of AC’s repertoire is disputed (UNBC claims it’s quite small). So how much of a loss this is remains to be seen. Second, it's not like these materials aren't already available through other licences held by universities. And we still have a fair dealing exception in the Copyright Act. I’ll leave the explanation of how that works to Michael Geist (this also links to a good FAQ on what opting out means for universities). Nothing's been banned. Throwing language like that around doesn't do your argument any favours.
The biggest problem with Degen’s opinion piece isn’t really his fault. Obviously this is a high-stakes, emotionally charged issue that highlights the upheaval that digital technologies are causing in the publishing industry. As far as I can tell, the Globe and Mail has done little-to-no reporting on an issue that has the potential to add millions of dollars to already-stretched university budgets, increase tuition and disrupt the way that many Canadian writers get paid.
But instead of providing readers with reportage that can allow them to situate Degen (and Knopf, and Geist, and me), they just throw Degen’s opinion out there. That’s a highly irresponsible act of policy bomb throwing from Canada’s supposed paper of record.
Monday, August 15, 2011
Google and the evil that lobbyists do?
I'm looking forward to reading Robert Levine's Free Ride: How the Internet Is Destroying the Culture Business and How the Culture Business Can Fight Back, although I'll probably wait until our library here at ANU orders it. At $28.95 for a digital download (only $5 less than the hardcover), no one will be able to accuse Levine or his publisher of looking for a free ride. They have, however, priced themselves out of my market (too-high prices, ironically, being one of the main causes of unauthorized downloads, according to the definitive survey on the subject).
In particular, I hope he goes into a lot of detail on Google's attempts to influence public policy, as Chris Castle's favourable review of Levine's book seems to suggest:
First off, all interest groups lobby for their preferred policies. The most direct way to lobby for your policies in Washington is to hire lobbyists to provide Congresspeople with money and research that supports your cause. On Capitol Hill, the content industries are widely acknowledged as the reigning champs at influencing policy. They've been very successful at wielding arguments (and money) to support their position. As for Google, they're still new at this game (the company isn't even 10 years old), but learning fast. In the second quarter of 2011, Google spent US$2.06 million on lobbyists. That's a lot, but the Recording Industry of America, in the first quarter of 2011, spent pretty much the same: US$2.1 million.
Second, lobbying involves battling to frame the debate, and everybody does it. Against academics like Lawrence Lessig and lobby groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, you have well-established groups like the Motion Picture Association of America. Google's relationship with academics (imagine!) like Lessig and agitators (which I say with respect; agitators drive debates) like the EFF is dictated largely by their position as upstarts. They're trying to promote a view different from accepted Washington orthodoxy. Right now, the dominant view of copyright on Capitol Hill is very favourable to the cultural industries; the EFF/Lessig/Google Axis of Infringement faces an uphill battle. For example, the U.S. position in talks like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership is very pro-stronger copyright and cultural industries.
So, sure, Google is flexing its economic muscles, but it's not like they're going up against underfunded ingenues. And it's certainly not like they're running the show.
When I see Google's attempts to influence the copyright debate in Washington and elsewhere, I see an upstart group attempting to break past several entrenched lobbies to promote its point of view. When I look at copyright policymaking, I see a process that continues to be dominated by cultural industries that have been "fight[ing] back" against technological change since the Clinton White House issued its National Information Infrastructure White Paper on Intellectual Property in 1995. In short, I see politics as usual.
And copyright is nothing if not political.
A few other thoughts:
In particular, I hope he goes into a lot of detail on Google's attempts to influence public policy, as Chris Castle's favourable review of Levine's book seems to suggest:
One of the truly significant themes in the book is how Levine has laid out in one place all the different ways that Google influences public policy around the world. This is done through his discussion of the execuprofs, groups like the EFF and Google’s massive contributions to Creative Commons, as well as a history of the YouTube case. I mean the Viacom case against Google–sorry. (Saying “the YouTube case” alone is like saying “my brother is in the Army, maybe you know him.”)As someone whose whole dissertation essentially came down to studying what groups influence copyright policy in North America and how they do it, this really caught my eye. I'd certainly agree that Google is lobbying for their point of view, but I find it hard to get that worked up about it, especially once we put Google's actions in perspective.
First off, all interest groups lobby for their preferred policies. The most direct way to lobby for your policies in Washington is to hire lobbyists to provide Congresspeople with money and research that supports your cause. On Capitol Hill, the content industries are widely acknowledged as the reigning champs at influencing policy. They've been very successful at wielding arguments (and money) to support their position. As for Google, they're still new at this game (the company isn't even 10 years old), but learning fast. In the second quarter of 2011, Google spent US$2.06 million on lobbyists. That's a lot, but the Recording Industry of America, in the first quarter of 2011, spent pretty much the same: US$2.1 million.
Second, lobbying involves battling to frame the debate, and everybody does it. Against academics like Lawrence Lessig and lobby groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, you have well-established groups like the Motion Picture Association of America. Google's relationship with academics (imagine!) like Lessig and agitators (which I say with respect; agitators drive debates) like the EFF is dictated largely by their position as upstarts. They're trying to promote a view different from accepted Washington orthodoxy. Right now, the dominant view of copyright on Capitol Hill is very favourable to the cultural industries; the EFF/Lessig/Google Axis of Infringement faces an uphill battle. For example, the U.S. position in talks like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership is very pro-stronger copyright and cultural industries.
So, sure, Google is flexing its economic muscles, but it's not like they're going up against underfunded ingenues. And it's certainly not like they're running the show.
When I see Google's attempts to influence the copyright debate in Washington and elsewhere, I see an upstart group attempting to break past several entrenched lobbies to promote its point of view. When I look at copyright policymaking, I see a process that continues to be dominated by cultural industries that have been "fight[ing] back" against technological change since the Clinton White House issued its National Information Infrastructure White Paper on Intellectual Property in 1995. In short, I see politics as usual.
And copyright is nothing if not political.
A few other thoughts:
- I'll be very curious to see how Levine recommends that the culture business (by which he seems to mean the companies that publish and distribute books, music, etc., and not the creators themselves) "fight back." I think pretty much everyone would agree that what they've been doing for the past 15 or so years hasn't been very successful in terms of staving off economic contraction.
- I also hope his book includes a discussion about how copyright (and all forms of cultural regulation) and technology favours certain types of creation over others (see, Beastie Boys, Paul's Boutique). In other words, that different types of cultural products get produced under different regimes is a fact of life.
- In his Guardian column touting his book, Levine doesn't seem to differentiate between the cultural industries and actual creators. The cultural industries are a means to the end of helping creators publish and distribute their works, and while historically economies have scale have made them necessary for creators to get their stuff out there, the two sides often have conflicting interests. Similarly, the objective of copyright historically has been to promote the creation and dissemination of creative works, not to support a particular industrial model.
- Does anybody know why Levine seems to have changed the title of his book from Free Ride: How Digital Parasites are Destroying the Culture Business, and How the Culture Business Can Fight Back? Calling someone a parasite (especially since many of these "parasites" are the culture industries' customers) is a pretty sure way to preempt a civil conversation.
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
The copyright hammer
It might just be me, but I've noticed an increase (from about zero) in articles and reports on the way that copyright restricts people's access to information and cultural works, with sometimes negative consequences. This morning, I stumbled across a series of articles in the U.S. Chronicle of Higher Education, titled "The Copyright Rebellion." They tackle the crucial issue of how copyright law actually interferes with teachers' ability to teach and students' ability to learn by making it unaffordable for professors to place copyrighted works on their curricula, or for music students to play works by composers who have been dead for decades.
Highly recommended, and a good reminder that the purpose of copyright is to promote both creation and dissemination. While it deals with U.S. copyright law, and Canadian copyright law is somewhat different (fair use in the U.S., fair dealing in Canada, for example), the general principles do apply in both cases. Whether copyright actually does promote creation is an open issue for which the evidence isn't all that favourable, as I've noted before. But there's no question that it restricts dissemination, as these articles amply demonstrate.
Supreme Court Takes Up Scholars' Rights
Out of Fear, Colleges Lock Books and Images Away From Scholars
Pushing Back Against Legal Threats by Putting Fair Use Forward (also has a list of links to articles on copyright and fair use for academics and librarians)
What You Don't Know About Copyright, but Should (U.S. focus)
Highly recommended, and a good reminder that the purpose of copyright is to promote both creation and dissemination. While it deals with U.S. copyright law, and Canadian copyright law is somewhat different (fair use in the U.S., fair dealing in Canada, for example), the general principles do apply in both cases. Whether copyright actually does promote creation is an open issue for which the evidence isn't all that favourable, as I've noted before. But there's no question that it restricts dissemination, as these articles amply demonstrate.
Supreme Court Takes Up Scholars' Rights
Out of Fear, Colleges Lock Books and Images Away From Scholars
Pushing Back Against Legal Threats by Putting Fair Use Forward (also has a list of links to articles on copyright and fair use for academics and librarians)
What You Don't Know About Copyright, but Should (U.S. focus)
Saturday, April 30, 2011
WikiLeaks cables: U.S. behind drive for Canadian copyright reform (who knew?)
I see that WikiLeaks has finally released the cables from the U.S. embassy in Ottawa. They’ll make for some fine reading as I prepare for my thesis defence (May 26 at Carleton University, Loeb Building A631 at 2 pm – bring your friends!). For now, you can catch up with some analysis from Geist (here (main one), here, here, here, here, and here) and Techdirt. Zeropaid also has a nice opinion piece on the whole release (h/t Russell McOrmond).
I’m happy to note that the cables, at first glance, seem to corroborate my dissertation’s argument as it relates to Canada (summarized here), so that’s good. Two things stand out to me.
First, one of my dissertation’s main points is that the United States usually can only get its way on reforming another country’s copyright policies if it offers something that the other country wants. True enough, but as the cables also suggest, a country can attempt to use the offer of copyright reform to try to get the United States to move on an issue of interest to it. In one cable, Canada says that U.S. movement on regulatory cooperation as part of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) was what it wanted in exchange for Canadian copyright reform.
These two points are mostly saying the same thing, but the second emphasizes that there can be a significant amount of give and take on such policy debates, even on an issue of great importance to the larger country. Whether it works or not is another issue (the U.S. here saw Canadian attempts to link copyright to an unrelated issue as a stalling tactic. That they would comment negatively on such a linkage also suggests that linkage remains the exception, not the rule, in Canada-U.S. relations).
Second, in reading these cables and others, I’m continually struck by how open the U.S. system of government is. I’d go so far as to say that the great value in the WikiLeaks cables isn’t in what they tell us about the United States, but what they tell us about our own, very secretive government. Going far afield of copyright, the Tunisian revolution was partly sparked by revelations not about what the United States was doing in Tunisia, but about what the Tunisian government was getting up to.
I’m happy to note that the cables, at first glance, seem to corroborate my dissertation’s argument as it relates to Canada (summarized here), so that’s good. Two things stand out to me.
First, one of my dissertation’s main points is that the United States usually can only get its way on reforming another country’s copyright policies if it offers something that the other country wants. True enough, but as the cables also suggest, a country can attempt to use the offer of copyright reform to try to get the United States to move on an issue of interest to it. In one cable, Canada says that U.S. movement on regulatory cooperation as part of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) was what it wanted in exchange for Canadian copyright reform.
These two points are mostly saying the same thing, but the second emphasizes that there can be a significant amount of give and take on such policy debates, even on an issue of great importance to the larger country. Whether it works or not is another issue (the U.S. here saw Canadian attempts to link copyright to an unrelated issue as a stalling tactic. That they would comment negatively on such a linkage also suggests that linkage remains the exception, not the rule, in Canada-U.S. relations).
Second, in reading these cables and others, I’m continually struck by how open the U.S. system of government is. I’d go so far as to say that the great value in the WikiLeaks cables isn’t in what they tell us about the United States, but what they tell us about our own, very secretive government. Going far afield of copyright, the Tunisian revolution was partly sparked by revelations not about what the United States was doing in Tunisia, but about what the Tunisian government was getting up to.
Monday, March 7, 2011
The ideology of copyright
Peter Nowak is currently running a series of posts offering predictions about the future of science and techology, including weather control (!). The whole series (actually, the entire blog) is worth reading, but today he has a post about the future of copyright, an issue of some interest to me. It's titled "2021: The move to worldwide copyright," but I wonder if a better title wouldn't be "The move to worldwide licensing." I'm pretty fixated on copyright these days, not so much on licensing, so I'd be happy to hear from anyone with an opinion on the subject. Any thoughts?
Anyway, I've posted a couple of lengthy comments there, including one in response to some typically insightful remarks by Russell McOrmond.
The comments allowed me to put to paper something I've been thinking about for a while: what would it take for people, companies and governments to move beyond a fixation on copyright toward a focus on what copyright is supposed to do, namely regulate the market in creative works. Competition, I think, isn't enough:
Read the whole post here.
Anyway, I've posted a couple of lengthy comments there, including one in response to some typically insightful remarks by Russell McOrmond.
The comments allowed me to put to paper something I've been thinking about for a while: what would it take for people, companies and governments to move beyond a fixation on copyright toward a focus on what copyright is supposed to do, namely regulate the market in creative works. Competition, I think, isn't enough:
When it comes to copyright, we’re dealing with a centuries-old policy that is rooted in two core Western beliefs: property and the individual. The major international copyright institutions (WIPO, TRIPS, and now ACTA) are devoted to promoting copyright. It’s so deeply ingrained that people talk as if it’s an end unto itself, rather than one specific tool for regulating markets in creative works. Once people in power start talking about copyright as a tool that should be judged on its effects, then change will become more likely. My biggest hope for the copyright debate is that it will one day shift from the realm of philosophy and legal theory to that of empirical economics. I’m still waiting.
At this point in time, it’s quite obvious that publishers, the other content industries and content creators who profit from the current copyright system believe as a matter of faith that copying is stealing. Hence the lobbying and the legal battles. A decade of bad press and faltering business models haven’t changed that. As far as I can tell, there seems to be very little evidence to suggest that this will change anytime soon. It has nothing with anyone being stupid. One’s ideologies change very slowly, if at all, since they’re at the core of our self-perception. It’s not surprising that companies, run by humans, leave money on the table all the time and often commit what seems like suicide rather than change with the times. I’m not going to make any predictions, but I’d suggest that taking ideology into account may complicate the story.
Read the whole post here.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
The Value of Music, Beatles Edition
For sale on the Mexico City Metro: Two hundred and thirty-seven Beatles MP3s on one CD-ROM for 10 pesos (about 95 cents Canadian). As someone who understands the importance of The Beatles to pop music but wouldn’t cross the street to hear one of their songs, that sounds about right. Maybe a bit too high. (I passed.)
It did make me wonder whether the prospective set of customers for a bootleg CD of The Beatles back catalogue overlap with those for a Beatles box set. How about with those for authorized MP3s, if they ever get around to releasing them? Not being a Beatles fan, I can't imagine purchasing any of them at any price, but given that unauthorized Beatles MP3s are surely available somewhere online already (not being a fan, I can’t be bothered to check), and that presumably anyone with an interest in The Bealtes would have already ripped their own CDs to their computer, what would motivate someone to wait years for the authorized MP3s?
Ten pesos is also an interesting price when you consider that those 10 pesos has to cover the costs of production (buying the blank CDs, and the computers to burn them) and distribution and labour costs (the network of hawkers selling the CDs) and still make a profit. Whoever sells these CDs must be making some money, since you can't go five minutes on the subway without being interrupted by a hawker pitching The Beatles or the Greatest Hits of the 80s or whatever.
By the way, I just purchased an e-book version of Landes and Posner's The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law from the Sony E-bookstore. For about $60. I leave the link between the Beatles and Landes and Posner as an exercise for the reader.
It did make me wonder whether the prospective set of customers for a bootleg CD of The Beatles back catalogue overlap with those for a Beatles box set. How about with those for authorized MP3s, if they ever get around to releasing them? Not being a Beatles fan, I can't imagine purchasing any of them at any price, but given that unauthorized Beatles MP3s are surely available somewhere online already (not being a fan, I can’t be bothered to check), and that presumably anyone with an interest in The Bealtes would have already ripped their own CDs to their computer, what would motivate someone to wait years for the authorized MP3s?
Ten pesos is also an interesting price when you consider that those 10 pesos has to cover the costs of production (buying the blank CDs, and the computers to burn them) and distribution and labour costs (the network of hawkers selling the CDs) and still make a profit. Whoever sells these CDs must be making some money, since you can't go five minutes on the subway without being interrupted by a hawker pitching The Beatles or the Greatest Hits of the 80s or whatever.
By the way, I just purchased an e-book version of Landes and Posner's The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law from the Sony E-bookstore. For about $60. I leave the link between the Beatles and Landes and Posner as an exercise for the reader.
Friday, November 20, 2009
In Mexico, creators and industry are getting together
Very interesting news here in Mexico. El Universal and others (all sources are in Spanish) are reporting that over 30 copyright-related groups are coming together to form the Coalición por el acceso legal a la cultura (Coalition for legal access to culture). According to composer and coalition co-president Armando Manzanero (rough translation): “We are uniting so that no one steals a song, a book or a picture, so that everyone pays royalties to the artists.”
What’s most significant is that this coalition unites artists’ collective societies and unions with those on the corporate side, such as the Asociación Productora de Fonogramas (the only industry group mentioned by name in the articles, though I understand from people I’ve talked with that the coalition basically includes everyone traditionally involved in copyright). Furthermore, it has the blessing of the two main government oversight bodies, INDAUTOR and IMPI, as well as the head of the main congressional oversight committee, la Comisión de Cultura de la Cámara de Diputados, Kenia López.
Generally speaking, the coalition favours stronger copyright laws (and enforcement). Their initial projects include working toward a copyright levy and a regime for ISP liability, since right now there is no specific Mexican law governing ISP liability. I also understand that they are interested in getting the government to enforce their copyright laws by granting them ex officio authority, meaning that the government would not have to wait for an infringement complaint to take action against suspected infringers. (I think this is the big one, since it moves the onus for enforcement from the private sector to the public sector and, thus, the taxpayer.)
Getting Ready for the Future
This coalition comes in advance of what will likely be a major reform of Mexican copyright law in a few years’ time. The last major reform to the Mexican Ley Federal de Derecho de Autor was in 1997, mainly (but not completely) to implement Mexico’s obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement; it was modified in 2003, notably to increase the standard copyright term to a world-leading life of the author plus 100 years (at the request of Mexican authors’ groups – not all copyright reforms are driven by American industry).
The upcoming legislative battle will likely pit coalition members against Mexican Internet Service Providers, with the coalition wanting the ISPs to undertake some form of policing of their networks and the ISPs trying to minimize their legal obligations. Having a coalition allows these disparate groups to work out their differences (and there will be differences) in private before dealing with the ISPs, and to present a unified front to the authorities, giving their conclusions a lot of weight.
Issue Framing
The coalition is also a savvy move in the battle for control of how the issue is framed. In countries like Canada and the United States, there is a growing appreciation that artists and distributors/producers sometimes have conflicting interests when it comes to copyright. It is no longer identified solely with authors, but rather as a commercial right whose benefits accrue mainly to large corporations. In contrast, the Mexican copyright discourse is still dominated by the Continental idea of copyright (or, rather, derecho de autor – author’s right) and is seen as a tool for the protection of the national culture (whereas in Canada, the claim that copyright serves mainly foreign, i.e., American, interests, has a lot of currency). This narrative is reinforced by the role of collective societies as providers of social programs to artists and as their main representatives in the legislative process. Having all these groups under one roof reinforces the idea of copyright as an author’s right, rather than as a commercial right.
Getting Ahead of the Public
The coalition is also getting ahead of another group that has proven increasingly vocal in places like Canada: the user community. While the past several years have seen an astonishing politicization of copyright in Canada, there is to date no evidence of a similar groundswell in Mexico. (According to one of my interview subjects, this book, released in July 2009, was intended partly as a way to kickstart a public debate over copyright in Mexico.)
Part of this lack of interest can be attributed to the low level of Internet penetration in Mexico. This won’t always be the case, however; as more Mexicans go online, they are likely to become more aware of how they are affected by copyright law. In the face of a well-organized coalition, it will be harder for consumers to organize effectively.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Tepito!
As I mentioned above, I'm in Mexico to study Mexican copyright policy (I'm actually comparing the implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties by Canada, the United States and Mexico to see what it can tell us about North American governance, but I'll save that for later). A few weeks ago, I went with my neighbour and his girlfriend to Tepito. If you're interested in copyright, then you've heard of Tepito. If you're a political junkie in Washington, you go to Capitol Hill; if you're into copyright, you gotta check out Tepito.
It's an infamous thorn in the side of the copyright industries and the Mexican government (Outside of copyright, it has a colourful history). The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) - the main lobby group for American copyright companies - claimed in 2008 that Tepito accounted for "65% of the pirate music product manufactured and distributed" in Mexico. Thanks to its deep connections with organized crime, it's also a no-go area for law enforcement.
Based on what I'd read about the place, I wouldn't have gone without my Mexican neighbour, but once there, it's an eye-opener (and it didn't feel too dangerous, but I may have been oblivious). That it's a veritable warren of stalls makes it familiar to anyone who's ever been to the night market in Chaing Mai, or countless other places throughout Asia and Latin America. I didn't see any CDs being burned, but I did see hundreds of DVD covers in the process of being prepared for assembly. Anyone who's interested in copyright and how it interacts with the real economy should definitely check it out.
Some thoughts and observations:
Free marketers would love Tepito. It's remarkably complex and has developed in the absence of government regulation. Many vendors specialize (some exclusively offered porn, Mexican movies, and arthouse flicks). They may also have overcome the quality problem associated with pirated materials. According to a professor I interviewed for my field research, many vendors offer you the opportunity to return the DVD if you're not satisfied with the quality. To me, this suggests that these vendors have developed roots in their community.
What's also interesting, for a lapsed economist, is the complementary (or symbiotic) economy that has developed around Tepito. Much (or most) of the stuff sold there may be stolen, but there are also a lot of vendors selling food (a lot of which looked quite tasty) and crafts. There is also a market (or more than one; I was unclear where Tepito ended and the others began) near Tepito; I'd bet that one depends on the other.
Price competition. Seeing the low prices for DVDs (three to five dollars Canadian) made me think that the really interesting question for copyright aficionados is not how to eliminate copyright violators, but why people still buy full-price CDs and DVDs and go to movies, when substitutes are available at a fraction of the price. Economically, it makes zero sense. I'd love to see any work that's been done on this (I've been too focused on the philosophy of copyright and the Internet treaties to be of much use here, unfortunately).
Full-price DVDs may be a status symbol: a form of conspicuous consumption unavailable to the majority of Mexicans, 50% of whom live below the poverty line. So what you have is two markets: the rich and the poor. The professor I mentioned earlier said he thought his students bought so much bootlegged material because while they've been trained to consume, being students, they lacked the means to buy authorized goods.
Extend this argument to the entire economy and you've got a situation in which an illegal market may not necessarily be a bad thing for the content industries. Cheap knockoffs may get people interested in consuming these status products; once they make enough money, they might switch to the more expensive legit (status) copies.
It also made me wonder what would happen if the copyright industries slashed their prices to compete with the bootleggers, and what the industry would look like at those prices. I'm going to have to do some hunting for papers on the economics of piracy. I'd love to know what their profit margins are.
Grist for a post-doc, maybe.
Availability. Contrary to what you read, you can't buy everything in Tepito. I looked high and low for a copy of Star Trek - for research purposes, of course - and I couldn't find a copy anywhere. I saw it on the streets for the first time two days ago. Wonder if they took any special precautions to keep it from leaking out.
The future. Mexican Internet penetration rates are still quite low. It would be interesting to come back in ten years and see if the commercial market for illicit CDs and DVDs had been replaced by non-commercial (potentially illicit, depending on what the law says at the time) file sharing by Net-savvy Mexicans. Tepito's days may be numbered, not by law enforcement, but by technology.
Friday, November 6, 2009
The Leaked ACTA Documents: What Next?
I had originally intended my first post to be more introductory (PhD student in political science at Carleton University in Ottawa, writing a dissertation on implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization Internet treaties in Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, former economist and reporter, currently working out of Mexico City trying to finish my dissertation so I can rejoin the workforce), but instead I’m going to jump right into what I hope will be regular postings related mainly to my academic work: copyright policy and North American regional integration. Comments always welcome.
I’ve been experiencing a bit of déjà vu reading Michael Geist’s recent postings on the leaked Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) which, despite its name, seems to have at least as much to do with copyright as counterfeiting (Geist has a link to a leaked description of the parts of ACTA related to ISP liability and technological protection measures). The secret negotiations among a group of (mostly) developed nations attempting to set a global standard that goes far beyond the existing international treaties, the leaks that have sparked outrage among activist groups, the negotiations outside the subject’s traditional fora: what we have here is practically a repeat of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI: OECD page; Wikipedia) in the late 1990s.
As a pup reporter for a small Toronto-based Catholic social-justice newspaper (how’re those for some loaded labels?), I filed many a story on the opposition to the MAI, and I remember how activists claimed victory when it was shelved. For those of you who don't recall the MAI, it was like the Battle of Seattle, only about global investment rules. Its defeat was seen as the first expression of what has come to be called global civil society.
For those concerned with the potentially harmful effects of an ACTA, which could include a three-strikes rule for repeat copyright infringers and a notice-and-takedown regime for ISPs, there are some important lessons to be learned from the MAI experience, the most obvious to me being:
Lesson #1: The negotiating forum matters. This is the big difference between the ACTA and the MAI. The MAI was negotiated under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD, and not the recently established WTO, was chosen as the negotiating body because it was felt that its limited, relatively homogenous membership (currently 30, mainly industrialized, countries) would make it easier to conclude an investment treaty. This treaty could then be presented to the rest of the world as a fait accompli without the bother of having to negotiate with countries whose interests may not be in sync with the richer OECD countries.
The one flaw in this plan was that the OECD was working under consensus rules: if one country objected, then the whole treaty would not proceed. Indeed, while activists can take a lot of the credit for the eventual demise of the MAI, it was actually the French government’s decision not to pursue the MAI that actually killed it but good.
The big question for ACTA opponents (and proponents, for that matter) is whether the talks are vulnerable to a country pulling a France before the end of negotiations next year. I don't know the answer to that question, mainly because (what with the secrecy and all) the terms under which the treaty is being negotiated are not readily available. But it would seem that so long as the United States, Japan and the European Union are on board (the U.S. isn't going anywhere; don't know about Japan or the EU), it doesn't matter if most other countries stay or go. If the United States can go into Iraq with Britain, Australia and Moldova as its main allies and call it a coalition, they could still negotiate a treaty with bit players and call it a new world standard.
So ACTA opponents will have to take into account the likely success of a treaty and plan accordingly. The basic strategy of the MAI protesters seems to remain valid here: international information coordination (the easy part) and domestic political pressure (the hard part). The real battle will probably take place country-by-country, first over whether to withdraw (Howard Knopf argues for walking away) and then over the treaty’s implementation.
While this likely will make the ACTA political debate different (and more difficult for opponents) than the MAI debate, the final outcome is not predetermined. Treaties can be modified before they are signed, and then they have to be implemented, and then enforced. As has been demonstrated by Canada’s inability to implement its obligations under the WIPO Internet treaties, and the U.S. refusal to implement the Kyoto Accord (which it signed), just because a country signs a treaty does not mean that it’s going to implement it.
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